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The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a flood of religious activity in parts of 
Central Asia. Along with the moderate and traditional forms of the Islamic faith, radical 
Islam reemerged in the Muslim communities of the Central Asian republics. Although, 
people of all backgrounds have been drawn to radical Islam, Islamists have been less 
successful in gaining support in the communities of indigenous populations of 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, than among the Uzbek and Tajik minorities. 
What explains variation in the extent of support of radical Islamic groups by ethnic 
minorities in Central Asia?  
Scholars have long been interested in examining the genesis and impact of Islamic 
threat on the regional stability and security of the individual Central Asian nations (see, 
for example, Malashenko and Olcott, 2001; Naumkin, 2005; Rashid, 2002; Sagdeev, 
2000). Some have also been concerned that ethnicity might reemerge as a trigger for 
intra-state conflicts (Ahmedova and Leitich, 2001). Few, however, have attempted to 
juxtapose ethnicity and Islamic radicalism and systematically examine an ethnic 
dimension of religious extremism and political violence in Central Asia.1 In this study, I 
aim to illuminate the differences in the ethnic makeup of members and supporters of 
radical Islamic groups in the Central Asian states, and suggest explanations for this 
variation.  
I contend that two related factors – the greater Islamicization of Uzbeks and 
Tajiks, and religious persecution of the ethnic minorities – have contributed to stronger 
support of Islamists by Uzbeks and Tajiks, than by other ethnic groups in Central Asia. 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia, International Political Science 
Review, 2010 31(2): 167-186. Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512110364738>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
 
For the purpose of this analysis, support for radical Islamic groups is defined broadly. It 
includes sharing the organizations’ goals, which can be as specific as the goal of building 
the region-wide Islamic Caliphate, or as broad as the task of saving all Muslims from 
suffering incurred by the infidel rulers. Support for Islamists encompasses participation in 
various activities of peaceful and violent nature coordinated by radical Islamic groups. It 
also denotes the instances of identification and membership in radical religious 
organizations.   
To explicate how Islamic identification promotes support for radical Islamic 
groups, this research relies on the tenets of social movement theory. The latter embraces 
an array of approaches that look at the structures of political opportunities, resource 
mobilization, and framing to explain why various forms of mobilization occur. In the 
context of this study, I treat radical Islamic movements as collective efforts to achieve 
political objectives outside of the sphere of established public institutions (Giddens, 
1997: 51). 
 Like all world religions, Islam is internally diverse. It manifests itself in a vast 
collection of experiences, practices, and currents. Muslim societies, groups, and 
individual believers can hold very different, even conflicting positions within its religious 
and political framework. The Central Asian authorities, however, adhere to a very 
simplistic dichotomous understanding of Islam that outlived the Soviet epoch. In this 
view, the state-regulated religious establishments are taken as legitimate and official, 
whereas everything else is deemed extremist and radical. In reality, Islam has many faces 
in Central Asia, and Islamic groups and movements are similarly diverse. What unites a 
spectrum of groups that I refer to as radical Islamic movements is the Islamist ideology 
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that calls for a return to the earlier models of Islam.2 The radical Islamic groups, 
themselves, are far from being uniform. They strive for distinctive visions of Islam and 
espouse different methods of “struggle in the way of God” (Esposito, 2005: 93). Some 
groups interpret jihad in a purely military sense and resort to violence for influencing 
politics in the Muslim nations. Others abstain from coercion in transmitting their 
message, even if it is a radical one. 
I begin by marshalling the evidence in support of the ethnic aspect of religious 
extremism, militancy, and terrorism in Central Asia.3 The second section presents 
explanations of the observed variation. Next, I demonstrate how a greater Islamicization 
and religious persecution of Uzbeks and Tajiks has contributed to the greater support of 
radical Islam by these ethnic minorities. The overview of the findings and broader 
theoretical inferences about the impact of Islamic socialization and framing on 
receptiveness of Muslims to radical religious calls concludes the study.  
Radical Islam in Central Asia: Focus on Ethnicity 
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, scores of ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, 
Turkmen, and Kazakhs were separated from their titular nationalities by the tangled 
borders of the newly independent states (see Table 1). In the past, the high concentration 
of Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks in the villages bordering the neighboring republics created 
a context for inter-ethnic clashes in the multi-ethnic communities of the Central Asian 
republics. Today, however, many political analysts reckon that the extant ethnic 
cleavages do not constitute a major threat to the regional stability. The rise of radical 
Islam has been viewed as the most alarming development in the Central Asian region.  
[Table 1 here] 
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The problem of religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia has been 
associated with activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
and a number of less known radical Islamic movements, such as Akramiya, Hizb an-
Nusra, and Tablighi Jamaat among others. The IMU is a terrorist organization infamous 
for a series of terrorist attacks and raids in the Central Asian states, and implicated in ties 
with the Taliban and al-Qaeda networks. It was established with the aim of toppling 
President Karimov’s secular regime in Uzbekistan, but later expanded its goals in an 
attempt to create a region-wide Islamic caliphate in Central Asia (Naumkin, 2003). 
Ideologically speaking, the IMU is a jihadist movement that is not truly Islamist. Its 
followers have no interest in the transformation of society or converting people to their 
beliefs. The organization has no political program beyond the conquest of power and the 
subsequent imposition of their vision of Islam upon people (Khalid, 2007: 16). Another 
group that has been increasingly active in Central Asia is the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami 
(The Party of Islamic Liberation). It pursues the same goals as the IMU, but officially 
eschews violence. 
All Central Asian states adopted restrictive religious policies and measures in an 
attempt to control and manipulate Islam. The bans on unregistered Islamic organizations 
and persecution of the thousands of Muslims suspected in collaboration with Islamists 
drove radical Islamic groups underground making their membership numbers and 
popularity difficult to estimate. The authoritarian nature of Central Asian governments, 
which often strategically manipulate the discourse on Islamic radicalization, also 
complicates scholars’ efforts at data collection.   
Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia, International Political Science 
Review, 2010 31(2): 167-186. Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512110364738>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
 
Although, some studies, news articles, and governmental reports assert that 
radical Islam has made a forceful comeback in the last decade in Central Asia, and its 
threat to regional security is growing, the reality is more complex. Central Asian states 
are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam4 and the rise of its radical and militant 
forms has been exaggerated by both the governments and the Islamists. Concerns about 
the radical Islamic movements persist, however, for a reason, as a number of reputable 
analyses recorded some growth in the rank-and-file members of radical Islamic groups 
(see, for example, reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a leading non-partisan 
organization with established presence in Central Asia (ICG, 2003a, 2003b)).  
The overthrow of the Taliban regime and the destruction of Al-Qaeda strongholds 
in Afghanistan severely weakened the IMU. The remnants of this militant organization 
created a number of splinter groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Turkistan and the 
Islamic Jihad Union, affiliated to, but not controlled by, the IMU. The former IMU 
fighters continue to recruit and train volunteers in parts of Central Asia, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan, but the numbers of militant Islamists are probably much smaller than 
figures declared by the governments of Central Asian states. After the last wave of 
terrorist violence in March 2004 in Uzbekistan, the focus of international attention has 
shifted to nonmilitant Islamic groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, whose public support has 
been rapidly spreading across the region.5  
The first records of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities in Uzbekistan appeared in the mid-
1990s. By 1999, the movement attracted between 6,500 and 7,000 followers, and the 
membership increased to 15,000 by 2003 according to the estimate of a well-informed 
Tashkent scholar (ICG, 2003a: 17). In Kyrgyzstan, where the group appeared in 1997, the 
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membership was between 1,000 and 2,000 in early 2000s, and reached as many as 7,000 
to 8,000 member by 2009 (ICG, 2009).In Tajikistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir recruited more than 
1,000 members in the early 2000s (ICG, 2003a: 18), and reports of its activities in 
southern Kazakhstan have appeared around this time as well. There, observers estimate 
the movement’s membership in low hundreds. Yet, the recent reports of the Kazakh 
security service allege unprecedented growth in the activities of other radical Islamic 
groups. In 2003, Kazakh police seized over 1,000 leaflets with radical Islamic calls. By 
2004, the number of seized pamphlets increased to 11,000, and a cell of the Jamaat 
Mujahedin of Central Asia with alleged ties to al-Qaeda was dismantled the same year in 
Kazakhstan (Shpekbaev, 2005). 
The Central Asian governments have been threatened with the growing popularity 
of radical Islamic groups and the recurrence of raids by Islamic militants, but have been 
deliberately inattentive to the ethnic aspect of religious extremism, militancy, and 
terrorism in their states. Yet, in each of the Central Asian republics, Islamists have been 
able to gain more support among Uzbeks and Tajiks, than among the indigenous Kyrgyz, 
Kazakh, and Turkmen populations.  
After the raids of Islamic militants on Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999, the 
IMU established a social base in the Ferghana valley, a densely populated and ethnically 
mainly Uzbek territory divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. The majority of the IMU recruits from the Kyrgyz population have been  
Uzbek (Amnesty International, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Kimmage, 2006). 
Official documents released by the Kyrgyz National Security Service contain references 
to the Uzbek ethnicity of Islamists.  
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The membership in non-militant Islamic groups operating in Kyrgyzstan has also 
been overwhelmingly Uzbek (ICG, 2003a; Rotar, 2006). Hizb ut-Hahrir, for example, has 
been very active in the Ferghana Valley as well as in the southern Osh, Batken, and Jalal-
Abad provinces of Kyrgyzstan where the Uzbek minority is concentrated (Botobekov, 
2001: 132). The Kyrgyz security sources claim that Uzbeks constitute up to 90 percent of 
the membership of Hizb ut-Hahrir, while ethnic Kyrgyz make up three to four percent 
(ICG, 2003a: 18). In fact, almost all members of Hizb ut-Tahrir arrested in Kyrgyzstan 
have been ethnic Uzbeks, and nearly all Islamic clerics implicated in collaboration with 
banned religious groups have been of Uzbek origin (Karagiannis, 2005, 141).  
Since the end of the civil war in 1997, Tajikistan has experienced a surge of 
militant attacks most of which were blamed on the IMU. The Tajik government claims 
that the IMU operatives are ethnic Uzbeks who crossed into Tajikistan from Uzbekistan 
fleeing prosecution by the Uzbek government in the aftermath of the 1999 terrorist 
bombings in Tashkent (Kimmage, 2006; Naumkin, 2005: 166). Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
Tajikistan is also heavily ethnic Uzbek with the majority of followers concentrated in the 
northern Sugd (former Leninabad) province, where Tajikistan’s Uzbek minority is 
primarily based. Some ethnic Tajiks have also been drawn to the group. However, the 
movement’s core constituency remains predominantly Uzbek (ICG, 2004; Naumkin, 
2005: 166). 
The growing radicalization of Islam in Kazakhstan has also occurred mostly 
among ethnic Uzbeks. The radical Hizb ut-Tahrir has been active in the southern 
Shymkent oblast bordering Uzbekistan. The Kazakh authorities deny the existence of 
home-grown terrorists and religious extremists maintaining that Islamists infiltrated 
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Kazakhstan’s southern regions from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia. Public reports 
released by the Kazakh security services and court rulings recounted by the international 
human rights groups also refer to the Uzbek fellowship of the radical Islamic groups in 
Kazakhstan. 
In Uzbekistan, as in other Central Asian states, Hizb ut-Tahrir derives its largest 
following from ethnic Uzbeks. The cities of Namangan, Kasansai, and Andijan located in 
the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley are considered to be the stronghold of radical Islam 
in Central Asia. However, radical Islamic groups also enjoy wide support among ethnic 
Tajiks in Uzbekistan, according to findings of the field researchers and the background 
information on the arrested Hizb ut-Tahrir members (Ahmedova and Leitich, 2001).  
Little information about radical Islamic groups in Turkmenistan leaks to the 
outside world due to the total secrecy of the regime established by late President 
Niyazov. Some analysts contend that no Islamists could escape the reach of the powerful 
repressive apparatus of the Turkmen government. Other regional specialists maintain that 
radical Islamic groups operate underground in Turkmenistan. Hizb ut-Tahrir, for 
example, has been active in the Turkmen prisons (ICG, 2003a). Some of the moves of 
late President Niyazov serve as evidence of Turkmenbashi’s growing concerns with the 
rise of radical Islam in the state, and fear of radicalization of Turkmenistan’s Uzbek 
population. In 2003, Niyazov deposed and imprisoned the Chief Mufti, Nasrullah ibn 
Ibadullah. Ibadullah is the ethnic Uzbek who had led Turkmenistan’s Muslims for more 
than ten years (Corley, 2004; Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2005). Following 
Ibadullah’s ousting from the post, many prominent Muslim Uzbek leaders were arrested 
and sentenced to different terms. The authorities have unseated ethnic Uzbek imams and 
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replaced them with ethnic Turkmen even in the areas predominantly populated by the 
Uzbek minority (Rotar, 2004c). The government reportedly ordered the forced relocation 
of some Uzbeks living along the common Uzbek-Turkmen border. Turkmen Muslims 
were banned from receiving religious education in Uzbekistan, and the government shut 
down Turkmenistan’s only university department of Muslim theology.  
In the closed political and media environment, there has been no discussion of the 
motives of the Turkmen government for taking a harder line against ethnic Uzbeks in 
Turkmenistan. Central Asian analysts speculate that Ashgabat’s attack on Uzbeks is an 
indirect consequence of turbulence in neighboring Uzbekistan, and fear of the rise of pro-
Islamic sentiments in the communities of Turkmenistan’s Uzbek Muslims.  
Rallying for Radical Islam: Theory of Support and Joining 
The recent tide of extremist and militant forms of Islam around the globe has 
reinvigorated research in radical Islamic groups. The majority of studies have drawn on 
the theories of social movements to explain the rise of the Islamist groups (Bayat, 2005; 
Karagiannis, 2005; Meijer, 2005; Wiktorowicz, 2002, 2004b). Some scholars emphasize 
the primacy of socio-economic conditions and psychological roots of Islamic activism. 
According to this reasoning, various socio-economic and political pressures breed public 
discontent, thus precipitating collective action (for a succinct review see Naumkin, 2005: 
21-31; Wiktorowicz, 2004a: 3). Other researchers shift their focus on the rational facility 
of people who weigh pros and cons of joining Islamist groups. From this perspective, 
support for Islamic movements is a rational decision inspired by various selected 
incentives provided to people by radical Islamic groups (Wiktorowicz, 2004a: 4-5). With 
the proliferation of interest in the role of ideas, identities, culture, and cognition, some 
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researchers turned to the analysis of frames that mediate the impact of various 
background conditions on people’s decisions. Frames render specific understanding of 
solutions to individuals’ grievances, and provide the rationale needed to encourage 
support for radical Islamic groups (Benford and Snow, 2000; Chandler, 2005). 
Socio-economic and political difficulties are ubiquitous across Central Asia (see 
Table 2). High unemployment rates, poverty, and shrinking welfare coupled with the lack 
of opportunities and poor governance can serve as a breeding ground for radical Islamic 
movements. Yet, the socio-economic and political distress is neither necessary nor 
sufficient condition for explaining the spread of radical Islam. Radical Islamic groups can 
emerge under conditions of social dislocation and economic stagnation. Islamists can also 
appear in the societies that are relatively developed socio-economically (Hafez, 2003; 
Naumkin, 2005: 22). There has been lack of evidence that convincingly demonstrates the 
existence of a relationship between various indicators of the levels of development and 
political depravation, on one side, and the rise of radical Islam and terrorism, on the other 
(see, for example, Hafez, 2003; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2006). 
The ranks of Islamist movements in Central Asia have been drawn from the 
relatively well-off and educated urban populations as well as from among the poorer 
segments of the Central Asian societies. Kyrgyzstan’s and Turkmenistan’s development 
indicators have been consistently below those in Uzbekistan, but Muslims in these 
republics have been less prone to religious extremism than in Uzbekistan. The latter has 
become a hotbed of the radical Islamic movements. However, other Central Asian states, 
particularly Tajikistan, have seen a steeper decline in living standards. In Kazakhstan, 
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too, the patterns of poverty distribution do not square well with the patterns 
characterizing the spread of radical Islam (see Table 2) (World Bank, 2004). 
[Table 2 here] 
There is no hard evidence that the provision of monetary rewards by Islamists is 
the primary reason for joining. Even if the recruits receive payments, it is very unlikely 
that many would risk their personal security and freedom for small financial benefits 
(ICG, 2003b). The Uzbek and Tajik minorities hold acute social, political, and economic 
grievances over persistent discrimination. However, the mere existence of deprivations is 
not enough to cause them join the radical Islamic groups. 
Why, on the background of progressive impoverishment of the population and 
increasingly undemocratic nature of all Central Asian regimes, more Uzbeks and Tajiks 
have been drawn to radical Islam than representatives of other ethnic groups in the 
region? It is my contention that, ceteris paribus, two related factors – the greater 
Islamicization of these ethnic groups and their religious persecution - explain minorities’ 
support of the radical Islamic groups. The impact of the identified factors can be best 
understood in the context of the social movement theory that provides a unifying 
framework of conditions that are connected to mobilization processes, including 
structures of political opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing. 
To induce participation in the high risk activities of radical Islamic groups, 
individuals have to be persuaded that the cause they choose to support is worth the perils 
and costs of involvement (Wiktorowicz, 2004a: 7). The ability of radical Islamic groups 
to convince individuals to join depends not only on the structure of political opportunities 
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and resource availability, but also their ability to frame their appeals in such a way that 
they resonate with the prospective members (Chandler, 2005).  
Poverty, discrimination, and other kinds of distress are important in that they 
compel people to seek out and embrace alternative views on the nature and causes of 
their problems. In the absence of other viable means of expressing dissent and affecting 
change, people can turn to radical Islamic groups that provide easy answers and simple 
solutions to social and individual concerns. Whether the movement’s message will reach 
the targeted audience depends on the people’s receptiveness to broad religious 
declarations. Those individuals who have had prior Islamic experiences are typically 
more receptive to the movement’s religious appeals (Wiktorowicz, 2004a).  
The stronger an individual’s identity is tied to Islam, the greater the likelihood 
that he or she will seek further exposure to Islamic teachings and become involved in the 
discussion and exchange of ideas over religious meanings and alternative ways of 
viewing the world (Wiktorowicz, 2004a: 8). The ability of an Islamic group to frame this 
debate in such a way that it resonates with the listeners’ experiences of discrimination 
and deprivation, as well as their Muslim identity, will determine success of its recruiting 
efforts. Once the frame alignment is achieved, i.e., individuals accept the group’s 
interpretations and solutions to the pending problems, they become more committed to its 
cause through participation in a variety of micro- and macro-mobilization activities, 
which can include study groups, independent readings, one-on-one discussions of Islam, 
as well various types of non-violent and violent action.   
Repression by the state will affect the structure of political opportunities of the 
Islamist groups. Yet, the nature of the relationship between state sanctions and dissent 
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has been one of the most perplexing questions (see, for example, Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 
1998). Some analysts claim that repressive measures inhibit mobilization efforts by 
increasing the costs of participation in various forms of dissent (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; 
Muller and Weede, 1990). For others, repression simply encourages more violent action 
(Khawaija, 1993).  
 Recent studies of Islamist movements support both conclusions. Preemptive and 
targeted state repression may reduce political violence and diminish the level of popular 
support for Islamist groups (Hafez, 2003: 72-76). However, as the level of violence 
employed by the state escalates to the points that it becomes indiscriminate and reactive, 
violent dissent by the radical Islamic groups will increase. Blanket repression will serve 
as a catalyst for increased public support of the Islamist opposition. Hafez (2003: xv) in 
his comparative studies of Islamic movements in Algeria and Egypt, as well as in Jordan, 
Pakistan, Tunisia, Kashmir, the Southern Philippines, Chechnya, and Tajikistan, found 
that Muslims of these states turned to violent means in response to indiscriminate 
repressive measures employed by exclusionary governments against their citizens during 
the period of mass mobilization. State repression triggered “a dynamic of radicalization 
characterized by exclusive rebel organizations that isolate Islamists from their broader 
society and foster antisystem ideologies that frame the potentially healthy competition 
between secularism and Islamism as a moral struggle between faith and impiety” (Hafez, 
2003: xv). State violence provides Islamists with an additional avenue for using Islam to 
legitimate the expression of both secular and religious concerns, and frame their 
teachings in such a way that they resonate with the individuals’ experiences of repression. 
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The following sections of the paper demonstrate how the historical differences in 
the introduction and practice of Islam in the societies of Central Asia translated in the 
varied role of Islamic faith among Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Turkmen. The 
greater Islamicization of Uzbeks and Tajiks increased susceptibility of these ethnic 
groups to Islamists’ religious teachings. The stronger religious identification exposed the 
devout Uzbek and Tajik Muslims to increased state persecution. In the absence of 
functioning interest-based organizations, or other institutions for channeling the 
minorities’ frustration and dissent, Uzbeks and Tajiks have used radical Islamic groups 
for expressing their grievances about social and political constraints and religious 
persecution. 
Patterns of Islamicization in Central Asia and Its Impact on Radicalization of 
Muslim Communities 
The Islamicization of Central Asia began in the second part of 7th century. It was a 
protracted and uneven process affected by rich pre-Islamic traditions, sedentary and 
nomadic cultures, and geopolitical situation in the region. Different patterns of 
dissemination and practice of Islam unfolded in two parts of Central Asia, namely, 
Mawarannahr (also known as Transoxiana), the territory between the Amy Darya and the 
Syr Darya rivers, and Turkistan occupying vast lands to the north-east of  Mawarannahr. 
The territory of Mawarannahr was populated by the people of Iranian origin and some 
Turkic tribes. It is in these early settlements of farmers and traders that the Arab armies 
brought new religion, Islam, in 7-8th centuries. The sedentariness of the ancestors of 
modern Tajiks and Uzbeks was an important factor in the early adoption of Islam and 
close observance of Islamic laws and prohibitions in Transoxiana. Islam is a religion of 
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settled people, since it requires a developed urban infrastructure for institutionalized 
Muslim practices. The natives of Mawarannahr built mosques and madrasas in their 
villages. The towns of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva developed into the major cultural 
and religious centers of the Muslim world.  
The wide steppes of Turkistan populated with itinerant tribes provided less fertile 
soil for Islam, and the nomadic culture was more difficult to convert. Although the 
present-day Turkmen had been in the Islamic orbit since the 10th century, most of the 
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were converted to the Sunni branch of Islam by the end of 19th 
century (Sagdeev, 2000: 8). Adopting Islam, the nomads adjusted the basic tenets of the 
new religion to their own “cosmological precepts,” socio-cultural values, and indigenous 
worldviews informed by the nomadic and tribal cultures (Allsen, 1997). The Islamic 
practices of the nomadic societies have been intricately entwined with pre-Islamic pagan 
traditions and adat, a common law prevalent in the steppe (Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 
1992: 150; Zhusupov, 2001). For that reason, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen have been 
known as nominal Muslims for they have never observed Islamic prohibitions and laws 
very closely.  
Thus, historically Islam played a more superficial and varied role on the territories 
of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan formally inhabited by nomads than in the 
regions of the sedentary Uzbek and Tajik Muslims. The policies of Tsarist and Soviet 
Russia had strengthened this pattern. During the colonial period the tsarist administration 
made an important distinction between the nomadic and sedentary populations based on 
the role of Islam (Khalid, 2007: 33). In the nomadic societies, where Islam was viewed as 
a small piece of the mosaic of pre-Islamic traditions, the Russian state promoted 
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Russification and supported the rule and practices of the indigenous law, adat. The 
sedentary populations associated with real Islam were to be governed by Shari’a. As a 
result, many Islamic institutions as well as educational and cultural spheres were left 
intact in both Turkistan and Transoxiana. In the sedentary regions local judicial systems 
based on the Islamic law provided a space for the growing influence of the ulema, the 
most educated Muslim scholars, and evolution of Islamic teachings (Khalid, 2007: 38). 
The Bolshevik government nearly decimated the main bastions of Islam. The new 
regime abolished religious educational institutions, banned the Shari’a courts, harassed 
Islamic clergy, and closed the mosques (Ro’i, 2000: 714). Although, the Soviet assault on 
the Islamic way of life was ferocious, the destruction of the main features of pre-1917 
Islam was not total. The Soviet purges drove Muslim ulema underground that helped to 
preserve the pre-soviet elements of Islam (Sagdeev, 2000: 9). The faith also stayed alive 
in the people’s consciousness and social practices, particularly in the most remote areas 
of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where significant number of mosques had survived state 
repression. Toward the end of the Second World War the Stalin regime had softened its 
stance on religion. In 1943, the government allowed the establishment of the Spiritual 
Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and permitted religious 
observance and education without persecution. The survived madrasas began offering 
theological education for a limited number of students, and some of the Soviet Muslims 
were allowed to travel abroad (Khalid, 2007: 78). 
When the Soviet government had loosened its grip on religion, Islam made a 
vigorous comeback. Yet, the Islamic revival in Central Asia was very uneven. The 
traditional centers of Islamic activity – Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the northern 
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parts of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan inhabited by Uzbeks, Uighurs, and Dungans – 
became the epicenters of the resurfaced Islamic tradition (see, for example, Ro’i, 2000: 
460). In late 1950s, 202 of 495 functioning mosques in the Soviet Union were in 
Uzbekistan, 18 in Kazakhstan, and only 4 in Turkmenistan (Ro’i, 2000: 62). The urge to 
open and register mosques in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was much less than in the 
historically sedentary areas populated by Uzbeks and Tajiks (Ro’i, 2000: 185). The latter 
two ethnic groups had a disproportionally high representation among the Islamic clergy.  
After the establishment of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central 
Asia and Kazakhstan some reformist ulema distanced themselves from the official clergy 
controlled by the Soviet regime. They took self-consciously conservative positions on 
issues of Islamic tradition and called for re-Islamicization of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
During the Brezhnev era, some of these Muslim clerics began teaching lessons to selected 
students in the underground religious circles in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Khalid, 2007: 
114). Later, these study groups evolved into politicized groupings of Islamic devotees, 
some of which identifying with Wahhabism (Miloslavski, 2001: 82). The other three 
“stans” – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan – saw very little of this kind of 
religious activity (Khalid, 2007: 114). 
In addition, after independence, Muslim activists from Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Afghanistan, and other Muslim states inundated Central Asia (Rashid, 2001). The 
Uzbek and Tajik communities attracted a bulk of these Muslim “missionaries” due to the 
previous contacts of the Uzbek and Tajik ulema with the outside religious world and 
concentration of the Islamic infrastructure in these Central Asian republics. The Uzbek 
and Tajik communities received a significant inflow of human and financial resources 
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utilized for the construction of new mosques and madrasas. There were 6000 mosques 
built in Uzbekistan in 1993, compared to 300 in 1989 (Yerekesheva, 2004: 584). In 
Tajikistan, 2000 new mosques were opened during 1989-91. Kyrgyzstan, on the other 
hand, had only 1000 mosques by 1995 with the majority of those mosques located in 
southern Kyrgyzstan (Karagiannis, 2005: 143; Yerekesheva, 2004: 584). In Kazakhstan, 
there were 1402 mosques built toward the late 1990s (Yerekesheva 2004: 585).  
Thus, in the communities of the Tajik and Uzbek Muslims, social and political 
conditions, the presence of influential Islamic clergy, developed religious infrastructure 
and intellectual environment were ripe for the emergence of radical Islam. The societies 
of the indigenous Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Turkmen Muslims lacked these important 
preconditions. Furthermore, the return to Islam took a somewhat different form in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two republics that had been subjected to intense 
Russification as a consequence of the influx of Russians. There, the public authorities and 
some ordinary people have been ready to embrace Islam as a part of the greater ethnic 
idea, and to assert a local identity against the Russians who had long overshadowed the 
local cultural life (Khalid, 2007: 119). 
In a nutshell, the differences in the prior socialization experiences with Islam 
exposed Uzbek and Tajik Muslims to radical Islamic teachings. The “cognitive opening” 
prompted by the socio-economic and political crises made them more receptive to radical 
Islamic calls that are typically framed so as to resonate with people’s personal and social 
problems. The extensive social and religious networks and a system of religious 
institutions have also enabled the outreach by Islamists. 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia has been particularly successful in utilizing its 
ideology in recruiting and mobilizing efforts. The movement has a long history of legal 
and underground work, and considerable experiences in propagandizing. The 
movement’s pundits prepared succinct descriptions of the religious, political, and 
economic foundations of an idealized Muslim state using selective interpretation of 
Islamic theology and history. Hizb ut-Tahrir developed theological arguments grounded 
in the passages from the Qur’an to vilify the governing regimes and to defend the 
promulgated religious ideals (Badadzhanov, 2001; Karagiannis, 2005: 144).  
The emissaries of Hizb ut-Tahrir have typically used the existing social and 
religious networks for launching new relationships with the congregation. The mosques 
and seminaries have also served as a convenient recruitment platform. After listening to 
the imam’s sermon, Muslims may stay in the mosque for discussion of some aspects of 
the religion. Questions about Islam or people’s individual concerns can be raised and 
discussed in the circles of friends or other social groups. It is in these guided 
conversations, as well as through leaflets and messages on the Internet, that the members 
of Islamist movements employ their views on Islam for legitimizing the listeners’ secular 
and religious frustrations and questions, and attempt to relate their teachings to people’s 
experiences and concerns.  
The Islamists rarely offer concrete explanations to problems, particularly in the 
social and economic domains. Instead, they invoke some “absolute” values and rely on 
effective emotional appeals. Pleas for equality and social justice, for example, have 
traditionally permeated the rhetoric of Islamists. In Central Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
attempted to match these appeals to the societies’ unique contexts by introducing some 
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elements of a socioeconomic and political program into their doctrine. In Tajikistan, that 
is still in recovery from the civil war carnage, Hizb ut-Tahrir has been stressing 
nonviolence as a method of struggle for their Islamic ideas (Naumkin, 2005: 161). In the 
Uzbek communities, Hizb ut-Tahrir has promoted a vision of a borderless and nationless 
Islamic state. For many Uzbeks, who feel dissatisfied with their post-Communist status 
and isolated from their families in Uzbekistan, these views have been very attractive 
(Karagiannis, 2005: 142).  
The simplicity of the Islamists’ teachings makes them very effective. The Islamist 
groups advocate reconstruction of an ideal society or an Islamic state, in which 
socioeconomic problems are nonexistent or can be resolved by implementing the 
principles of Shari’a law. This religious message appears convincing in the region of 
growing inequality, rampant corruption, and rigid authoritarianism. Particularly those 
who have been socialized in the Islamic context are more predisposed to embrace and 
defend these views. 
Religious Persecution of Ethnic Minorities 
Because of the greater spread of radical Islam in the communities of Uzbek and Tajik 
Muslims and tight association of Islamism with these ethnic groups, nearly all measures 
aimed at combating terrorism and religious extremism in Central Asia have impinged on 
the Uzbeks and Tajiks. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, following the IMU raids in 1999, 
hundreds of ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Afghans were rounded up on suspicion of 
collaboration with the Uzbek and Tajik fighters (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In a series 
of counterterrorism operations that followed the incursions, Kyrgyzstan’s security forces 
raided Uzbek communities, and some Uzbek settlers were detained without a warrant for 
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arrest (Azimov, 2006). In 2006, the Kyrgyz authorities conducted more counterterrorism 
sweeps killing some people and arresting dozens of alleged Islamic radicals, mostly 
ethnic Uzbeks (Firdavsi, 2006). 
The Kyrgyz law-enforcement agencies have persecuted several Uzbek imams for 
their supposed involvement in radical Islamic groups, and tolerated occasional abductions 
of Islamic activists by the Uzbek secret service. In the fall of 2006, following the 
government’s killing of a prominent ethnic Uzbek religious leader, Rafig Qori 
Kamuluddin, implicated in ties with the IMU, the security services of Kyrgyzstan 
developed a special plan for strengthening state control of the republic’s Islamic clergy. 
The plan envisages, among other things, extensive monitoring of the Kyrgyz citizens of 
Uzbek and Uighur origin who have lived in the south of the republic, and those 
individuals who have arrived from Uzbekistan (Djuraev, 2006).  
For a long time, there has been a deep-seated animosity between Tajiks and 
Uzbeks6.which translated into mutual distrust and a tenuous relationship between the 
Tajik and Uzbek governments (Torbakov, 2001). The civil war in Tajikistan 
reinvigorated this historical rivalry between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Tajik 
government accused its Uzbek counterpart of supporting political unrest and separatist 
aspirations in Tajikistan’s Leninabad oblast (Human Rights Watch, 1998). This most 
“Uzbekified” part of Tajikistan has traditionally maintained strong political, economic, 
and cultural ties with Tashkent. Dushanbe authorities also insisted that Mahmud 
Khudorberdiyev, the rebellious Uzbek colonel, received some assistance from Uzbekistan 
(Parker and Branch, 2000). Following the 1997 uprising led by the renegade colonel, the 
government of Tajikistan took revenge on the Uzbek population. After the government’s 
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detachments drove off the rebel’s brigade, the troops looted the ethnic Uzbeks’ homes to 
punish them for the alleged support of the commander (Open Society Institute, 1998). 
 For Dushanbe’s authorities, Hizb ut-Tahrir has been an “Uzbek movement” (ICG, 
2003b). Naturally, the map of geography of arrests of the alleged members of Hizb ut-
Tahrir has corresponded to areas with high concentration of the ethnic Uzbeks (ICG, 
2003b). The followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir have endured unfair trials and have been abused 
in detention, and the relatives of the movement’s supporters have been harassed by the 
government of Tajikistan (Abdullaev, 2004).  
 Uzbekistan’s government has traditionally used a decidedly authoritarian 
approach toward the supporters of Islamist movements. Tashkent’s authorities have also 
been known for their persecution of Muslims of the Tajik descent. The latter have been 
portrayed as the Islamists’ sympathizers, and the “terrorist” image has served as a pretext 
for harassing the ethnic Tajiks (Amirkulov, 2005). In 2000, the Uzbek security services 
evicted several hundreds of Tajik families from villages in southern Sukhandrya region 
with the alleged purpose of clearing the area of the IMU troops. The settlers were 
transferred to a wilderness in the southern Sherabad district, while the Uzbek air force 
destroyed their homes. About 70 ethnic Tajiks from Dara-i-Nihon, including 21 teachers, 
were charged with complicity in terrorism. The defendants confessed to the alleged 
crimes under duress and were imprisoned for between eight and eighteen years (U.S. 
Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2001).  
Regional experts have noted the impact of Tashkent’s indiscriminate repression 
on the radicalization of Muslim believers and spread of radical Islam in Uzbekistan. For 
instance, most of the female suicide bombers who took part in the 1999 explosions in 
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Tashkent were the family members of the prosecuted Uzbek Muslims, and their violence 
was a sign of protest against the harsh policies of the government of Uzbekistan 
(Naumkin, 2005: 116). The deepening resentment of the Tajik population has also 
matched the growing influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir. The movement enjoys wide support 
among Uzbekistan’s Tajiks who have become discontent with persistent oppression, 
growing poverty and unemployment, and the heightened border regime with Tajikistan 
introduced by Uzbekistan. 
In Kazakhstan, fewer ethnic Uzbeks have been drawn to Islamist movements than 
in the neighboring states. This stands in the marked contrast with the situation in southern 
Kyrgyzstan where virtually all Kyrgyz members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are ethnic Uzbeks. 
One reason for this discrepancy is Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition. There are fewer 
Uzbeks in Kazakhstan than in Kyrgyzstan (3.7% against 14.2% of the total population), 
and Russians constitute the largest non-titular nationality. Until 2005, the law-
enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan had no legal ground for prosecuting Islamists, and 
activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir were not officially banned (ICG, 2003b). Kazakhstan’s more 
liberal religious policy and fewer constraints on the rights of the minority groups have 
been an important barrier to mobilization of Uzbek Muslims.  
The situation may change, however. In 2004, several ethnic Uzbeks from the 
Shymkent oblast of Kazakhstan were implicated in a series of Tashkent suicide bombings 
in Uzbekistan. Following these attacks, Kazakhstan’s government intensified measures 
against radical Islamic groups, and tightened control over religious practices, particularly 
in the south of the country. Uzbek imams in southern Kazakhstan came under the 
renewed pressure of subordination to the state-backed Spiritual Administration of 
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Muslims in Kazakhstan (Ponomarev and Jukeyeva, 2002). Instituted in 1990, the 
Administration initiated the displacement of ethnic Uzbeks from their positions as imams, 
and today most of the mosques in the south of Kazakhstan are headed by ethnic Kazakhs. 
This situation is upsetting to local Uzbeks who choose to commute to Uzbek villages for 
important prayers because, in their view, Kazakh religious leaders possess less profound 
theological knowledge than the Uzbek clergy (Rotar, 2004a, 2004b). Since 2004, all 
imams in the South of Kazakhstan have had to pass a compulsory re-attestation (Rotar, 
2005). In a sign of the growing discontent with religious policies of the Kazakh 
administration, Muslims of Kazakhstan staged an unauthorized demonstration in Almaty 
in January 2005. Following this event, the Kazakh security forces carried out a stream of 
arrests of the supposed members of Hizb ut-Tahrir who were accused of staging the 
unauthorized protest. The Kazakh authorities began closely monitoring the Uzbek-
populated areas of Kazakhstan. The arrests of the members of banned organizations and 
the seizure of Islamists’ literature have become more pronounced in the republic’s south 
(Mukhametrakhimova, 2006).  
Conclusion 
The goals of this research were to demonstrate the differences in the ethnic make-up of 
radical Islamic movements in Central Asia as well as to explain the observed variation in 
the extent of support of radical Islamic groups by various ethnic groups. Although, 
representatives of all ethnic backgrounds have been drawn to radical Islamic groups, 
Islamists’ proselytizing efforts have been particularly effective among ethnic Uzbeks in 
southern Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, as well as among Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Tajiks 
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in Uzbekistan. The study attributed this success to the greater Islamicization of Uzbeks 
and Tajiks, and religious persecution of the ethnic minorities.  
The rise of Islam in the communities of Uzbek and Tajik Muslims has 
demonstrated the importance of Muslim identity, ideology, and framing in garnering their 
support. The failure of secular democratic resistance in Central Asia is linked to the fact 
that democracy, as defined in the West, is an alien notion to many Central Asians who 
have been less inclined to fight for the democratic ideals and ideology imposed from 
abroad. The Central Asian authorities have employed the rhetoric of democracy for 
boosting their international and domestic image, but repeatedly stated that they would 
promote their own “special” types of democracy informed by specific circumstances of 
their countries’ development.  
Historical experiences from the Soviet and colonial past have left their marks on 
the internal developments of the Central Asian republics. The legacy of the communist 
rule has been a big handicap for establishing a democratic rule. The resurgence of Islam, 
a potent political and cultural force, has stifled other nationalist trends and establishment 
of democratic institutions (Hunter, 2001). The Central Asian authorities eagerly 
embraced Islam, if only its official permutation, and used the Islamic creed to bolster the 
legitimacy of regimes. The advocacy of democratic ideas and activities of democratic 
organizations were severely curtailed in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, where democratic movements received more popular support, they were 
much weaker than movements of civil rights and political freedoms active in Eastern and 
Central Europe. 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia, International Political Science 
Review, 2010 31(2): 167-186. Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512110364738>. 
Open Access Version: <http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/>.
 
This study found that Islamists’ efforts were less successful in the communities of 
the ethnic Kyrgyz. Part of the reason comes from the fact that their Islamic identity is 
relatively new and not well-defined. The religious beliefs of the Kyrgyz Muslims have 
been rather eclectic. Since recently, however, some noted the growing religious self-
consciousness and religious seeking among the ethnic Kyrgyz. The soaring grassroots 
interest in Islam combined with the worsening economic and political situation in the 
country reopened a window of opportunity for radical Islamic groups. Hizb ut-Tahrir, for 
example, has adjusted its framing and proselytizing tactics there. Traditionally, it focused 
on vilifying the rule of president Karimov in Uzbekistan. Today, it calls for the toppling 
of the Kyrgyz secular government. More of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature is published in 
Kyrgyz with some leaflets condemning the policies of Kyrgyzstan’s “infidel” and 
corrupted leaders. 
Since the rise of radical Islam is, to a large extent, about religious beliefs and 
ideas, it should be responded to at this level as well. The state-imposed strictures on 
media freedom and religious controls are encouraging a turn to Islamism, which 
continues to fill in the informational and ideological vacuum created after the Soviet 
demise. The new legislative measures adopted by each of the Central Asian states with 
the aim of combating terrorism and religious extremism repel local and national media 
from any serious discussion or in-depth coverage of religious topics. Instead of stifling 
religious freedom and limiting discussion of the issues of faith, the Central Asian 
governments need to promote extensive religious and spiritual education, encourage 
dialogue within Islam, and support the expansion of critical coverage of religious issues 
by broadcasting organizations. One of the most effective strategies for coping with the 
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growth of radical Islamic movements and politization of Islam is through enlisting the 
assistance of competent theologians at the local and national levels. For this to happen, 
the official Islamic clergy should expand its educational, ideological, and informational 
work with the population to improve its reputation, increase trust, and perception of 
religious knowledge.  
The stronger Islamic identification of Uzbeks and Tajiks not only facilitated their 
mobilization by radical Islamic movements, but also exacerbated ethnic and religious 
tensions in the ethnically-mixed communities of the Central Asian states. There has long 
been a latent rivalry among the Central Asian ethnos regarding their “Muslimness” 
(Lubin and Rubin, 1999). The settled Uzbeks believe that they are better Muslims than 
Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, whereas Tajiks contend that they are the “real Muslims” of Central 
Asia, as opposed to peoples of the Turkic origin (Ahmedova and Leitich, 2001). This 
competition around the degree of religiosity of different ethnic groups gave rise to a 
widespread practice of constructing ethnically separate mosques and religious schools for 
Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims. The governments’ clampdown on the Uzbek and 
Tajik believers has further complicated relations of ethnic minorities with authorities of 
the Central Asian states and reinforced the dividing lines between titular nationalities and 
other ethnicities. The correspondence of the growing inter-ethnic tensions with activities 
of Islamists has been a deeply troubling development, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. The 
south of the Kyrgyz republic has seen an alarming number of small-scale clashes between 
the indigenous population, and the Uzbeks and Tajiks (Khamidov, 2002). The local 
authorities have recorded a number of violent attacks with the representatives of other 
faiths (Rotar, 2006). Some public officials expressed concerns that in the future Islamists 
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will attempt to foment an inter-ethnic conflict in the Ferghana Valley to destabilize the 
situation in the region and weaken the governing regimes.  
The evidence examined in the study suggests that the strategy of governmental 
reprisals has been ineffective in eliminating or reducing the spread of radical Islam. The 
governments’ repression served as a temporal deterrent that drove some Islamists 
underground. Yet, over time, vigorous region-wide crackdown on radical Islam resulted 
in more militancy and an increase in the number of religious zealots. Repressive politics 
toward Muslims practicing their faith outside of religious confines established by the 
Central Asian states has become yet another in a series of grievances that has radicalized 
moderate believers, and generated widespread sympathy for the oppressed in the broader 
population.  
To neutralize the threat of radical Islam, the Central Asian governments need to 
explore alternative paths. The socio-economic and political reforms that will improve 
people’s lives regardless of their ethnic background are necessary conditions for the 
achievement of social harmony in the Central Asian republics. The governments of the 
Central Asian states should develop and enact measures that will assist the ruling elites in 
gaining support of moderate Islamic groups and those Islamists who are open to a 
dialogue with state officials. To thwart radical groups’ attempts at gaining large-scale 
support among Uzbeks and Tajiks, the governments have to foster initiatives designed to 
accommodate the interests of these ethnic groups, and integrate the ethnic minorities into 
the Central Asian states and societies. Repressive tactics against minority groups are 
counterproductive and should be avoided at any cost. The use of counterterrorist and 
counter-extremist operations as a pretext for suppressing minorities’ campaign against 
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various forms of ethnic discrimination is an unacceptable move that will stir up hostility 
toward the governing regimes rather than lay foundation for stability in the region. 
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Notes 
1 A notable exception is Oliver Roy (2000) and Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis. The latter 
claims that Hizb ut-Tahrir is essentially an Uzbek phenomenon, particularly in southern 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
2   There are many conceptual disagreements on the best terminology and precise meaning 
of different strands and manifestations of Islam. For discussion of some basic concepts 
and terms in Islam, including but not limited to “Islamic fundamentalism”, “Salafism”, 
“Islamism”, “jihadism” and others, (see Khalid, 2007; Naumkin, 2005, among others).  
3 Data on detentions, arrests, trials, and thwarted terrorist attempts in the republics of 
Central Asia was retrieved from a larger dataset on states’ responses to terrorism that the 
author created using event data collection techniques. The primary source of information 
for coding events on various dimensions of states’ responses to terrorism was the wire 
reports downloaded using the LexisNexis® Academic newswire service. To triangulate 
conclusions from the event data analysis, I conducted a series of unstructured interviews 
with political analysts, representatives of human rights groups, and ordinary practitioners 
of Islam in Kyrgyzstan. I also systematically examined reports (in English and Russian) 
published by the reputable analytical sources that monitor political and security trends in 
Central Asia, and examined evidence from ethnographic and field studies of radical 
Islamic groups. 
4 The majority of Central Asians belong to Hanafi Sunnism, the most tolerant and liberal 
school of thought of Sunni Islam. According to the CIS World Fact Book (2008), in 
Kyrgyzstan, 75 percent of the population professes Islam; in Kazakhstan – 45 percent; in 
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Tajikistan and Turkmenistan - 85 and 88 percent respectively; and in Uzbekistan – 89 
percent.  
5 The situation may change. In the wake of the shootouts between the police and armed 
Islamists in the Uzbek capital in summer 2009, the Central Asian authorities have been 
alarmed by the resurgence of activities of the IMU militants. 
6 One of the longstanding sources of row in the Uzbek/Tajik relations is the divergent 
interpretation of national historiographies and competing claims to Bukhara and 
Samarkand. (for further discussion, see Torbakov, 2001). 
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Table 1. Ethnic Composition of Central Asian States 
Country/ 
Province 
Uzbeks 
% 
Tajiks 
% 
Kyrgyz 
% 
Turkmen 
% 
Kazakh 
% 
Russians 
% 
Population 
(millions) 
Uzbekistan 
- Ferghana 
Valley 
- Andijan 
- Ferghana 
- Namangan 
75.8 
84.2 
 
85.0 
83.6 
84.1 
4.8a 
5.0 
 
1.4 
5.5 
8.8 
0.9 
4.2 
 
4.2 
2.1 
1.1 
0.6 4.2 6.0 
3.0 
 
3.9 
4.9 
1.9 
23.0 
6.2 
 
2.0 
2.4 
1.7 
Tajikistan 
- Sugd 
24.8 
31.3 
68.4 
56.9 
1.3 
1.2 
n/a 0.4 3.2 
6.5 
5.9 
1.8 
Kyrgyzstan 
- Ferghana 
Valley 
- Osh 
-Jalalabad 
- Osh City 
14.2 
26.7 
 
28.0 
24.5 
40.9 
0.8 
1.6 
 
2.1 
0.6 
0.4 
60.3 
73.5 
 
63.8 
67.3 
29.1 
n/a 0.9 15.7 
2.7 
 
2.4 
3.3 
n/a 
4.7 
2.5 
 
1.5 
0.9 
0.2 
Kazakhstan 3.7 0.2 n/a n/a 53.4 30.0 8.0 
Turkmenistan 9.8 n/a n/a 78.5 2.1 5.2 3.6 
a This figure underreports the actual number of ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan. In the past, 
the Soviet censuses identified the residents of Uzbekistan as Uzbeks irrespective of their 
ethnicity. Today, many Tajiks identify themselves as Uzbeks to avoid social 
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discrimination and governmental restrictions of educational and employment 
opportunities (Hunter, 2002). 
Source: Lubin and Rubin, 1999: 35; Szayna, 2003: 153-7. 
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Table 2. Socio-Economic and Political Conditions in Central Asia 
 GNI 
per 
capita 
($US), 
2006 
GDP 
per 
capita 
average 
annual 
growth 
rate 
(%), 
1990 -
2006 
Average 
annual 
rate of 
inflation 
(%), 
1990 -
2006 
% of 
population 
below 
US$1 a 
day, 
1995 -2005 
Employment 
to 
population 
ratio (%), 
both sexes 
(15+ years 
old), 2006 
Total 
adult 
literacy 
rate, 
2000 - 
2005 
Level of 
democracy, 
2006 
(POLITY 
IV score on 
democracy)a 
Kazakhstan 3690 2.6 83 <2 64.7 100 0 
Kyrgyzstan 490 -0.9 51 <2 58.7 99 3 
Tajikistan 390 -3.1 109 7 47.9 100 1 
Turkmenistan 1340 -6.8 408 12 59.6 99 0 
Uzbekistan  610 0.7 117 <2 57.7 n/a 0 
 
a Polity IV democracy index is an eleven-point scale (0-10) measure of institutionalized 
democracy derived from the scores on the competitiveness of political participation, the 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constrains on the chief 
executive  (Marshall and Jaggers 2001). In this index, “0” stands for the lowest possible 
level of democracy. 
Sources: UNICEF, 2007; United Nations, 2007. 
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